We present an algorithm which attains O( √ T ) internal (and thus external) regret for finite games with partial monitoring under the local observability condition. Recently, this condition has been shown by Bartók, Pál, and Szepesvári [4] to imply the O( √ T ) rate for partial monitoring games against an i.i.d. opponent, and the authors conjectured that the same holds for non-stochastic adversaries. Our result is in the affirmative, and it completes the characterization of possible rates for finite partial-monitoring games, an open question stated by Lugosi, and Stoltz [6]. Our regret guarantees also hold for the more general model of partial monitoring with random signals.
Introduction
Imagine playing a repeated zero-sum game against an opponent (column player) where the loss is defined by a given matrix L ∈ R N ×M . Unlike the classical full-information scenario, however, we (the row player) do not observe the moves of the opponent and instead receive some signal given by the known matrix H ∈ Σ N ×M defined over some alphabet Σ. Specifically, for the choices i and j of the row and column players, the row player observes the signal H i,j . Neither the move of the opponent nor the incurred loss L i,j is observed by the row player. In this paper, we are concerned with rates for external and internal regret achievable in this scenario.
The question of characterizing such rates in terms of the matrices L and H has been raised by CesaBianchi, Lugosi, and Stoltz [6] . Under a linear dependence between the matrices L and H, the authors proved O(T 2/3 ) rates for external regret, yet noted that there exist games with the Θ( √ T ) behavior (e.g. the so-called bandit feedback games where L = H). Similar distinction in available rates also appears to hold for internal regret: an O(T 2/3 ) upper bound was shown in [6] , while the rate of O( √ T ) is achievable for bandit feedback by the result of Blum and Mansour [5] .
Recently, Bartók, Pál, and Szepesvári in [3, 4] made key insights into the problem of partial monitoring. In particular, [4] characterized the rates for external regret against an i.i.d. (stochastic) opponent. The authors showed that rates can only be one of Θ(1), Θ( √ T ), Θ(T 2/3 ) and Θ(T ), and that a so-called local observability condition plays a key role in determining this growth behavior. In the non-stochastic (adversarial) case, however, no general characterization is available to date, with the notable exception of games with two adversarial actions [3] . As suggested by [4] , to provide a complete characterization for external regret against non-stochastic opponents, it would be enough to show an upper bound of O( √ T ) under the local observability condition. The characterization would follow because [4] proves a Ω(T 2/3 ) lower bound when local observability does not hold (yet the game is not hopeless with Ω(T ) regret) and the upper bound of O(T 2/3 ) is achieved by the algorithm of Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [10] through the analysis of [6] . This paper presents an algorithm, Neighborhood Watch, with an upper bound of O( √ T ) for both internal and external regret against a non-stochastic opponent under the local observability condition. Together with the results mentioned above, this completes the characterization for both internal and external regret. It is remarkable that the condition of local observability that characterizes games against a stochastic environment also characterizes games against non-stochastic opponents.
We now summarize our approach. First, we define a notion of local internal regret which postulates that the player does not benefit by switching any of its actions to a neighboring action. The neighbor relation is defined by the neighborhood graph of best responses to mixed strategies of the opponent. Second, we show that small local internal regret implies small (global) internal regret. We then present an algorithm which randomly chooses a neighborhood and then chooses an action in the neighborhood. A key property satisfied by the two-level procedure is a certain flow condition. Under this condition, external regret of sub-algorithms on local neighborhoods can be turned into a statement about local internal regret (and, hence, global internal regret). External regret of the sub-algorithms, in turn, can be upper bounded because local observability condition allows us to estimate relative losses of neighboring actions.
Notation and definitions
We follow the notation of [4] . Let i denote the ith row of L. Without loss of generality, assume that each row of H contains unique sets of symbols. Let σ 1 , . . . , σ si be the list of symbols in the ith row of H. The signal matrix S i ∈ {0, 1} si×M is defined by S i (k, j) = I {H i,j = σ k } where I {} is the indicator function. For a pair i, k of actions define S (i,k) ∈ {0, 1}
(si+s k )×M by stacking S i on top of S k . Note that, upon playing action i, the signal H i,j arising from the unobserved action j is equivalent to the feedback S i e j .
Let C = {C 1 , . . . , C N } be a partition of the simplex ∆ M according to the best response (action) of the player to the mixed strategy of the adversary:
We assume that no action is completely dominated by others; that is, each C i is non-empty. Further, for simplicity we assume that C is indeed a partition and there are no degeneracies (we can modify the argument by defining neighborhood action sets as in [4] ). Neighboring actions are naturally defined as those that share a boundary in the partition. Let G be the graph obtained by connecting the neighboring cells of the partition C. The vertex set of G is precisely the set {1, . . . , N } of player's actions. For each action i, let the set of its neighbors N i be called the neighbor set. By convention, any vertex is its own neighbor: i ∈ N i . We will often use the terms action and vertex interchangeably, thanks to the one-to-one correspondence. Under the local observability condition, for each pair of local actions i, j there exists a vector
. Since L and H are known, we can compute vectors v (i,j) and use them to construct unbiased estimates of true loss differences. 
Internal Regret in the Neighborhood
Let φ : {1, . . . , N } → {1, . . . , N } be a departure function [6] , and let i t and j t denote the moves at time t of the player and the opponent, respectively. At the end of the game, regret with respect to φ is calculated as the difference of the incurred cumulative cost and the cost that would have been incurred had we played action φ(i t ) instead of i t , for all t. Let Φ be a set of departure functions. Φ-regret is defined as
where the cost function considered in this paper is simply c(i, j) = e T i Le j . If Φ = {φ k : k ∈ [N ]} consists of constant mappings φ k (i) = k, the regret is called external. For (global) internal regret, the set Φ consists of all departure functions φ i→j such that φ i→j (i) = j and φ i→j (h) = h for h = i. Under the local observability condition, we can estimate the differences in performance between the action and its neighbors in a way similar to non-stochastic bandit methods. We can, therefore, ensure that any time we chose an action, its loss was not much more than that of any of its neighbors. That is, local observability condition leads to an algorithm with no external regret and, under the flow condition detailed later, no local internal regret. A key observation is that no local internal regret implies no global internal regret. Intuitively, this stems from the fact that the second-best-response action must be a neighbor of the best-response action. Hence, ensuring small internal regret against the neighbors is enough to guarantee small internal regret. Figure 1 : Illustration of the argument in Lemma 3.1: A second-best action must either be a neighbor, or it must be dominated everywhere by other actions.
Lemma 3.1. Local internal regret is equal to internal regret.
Proof. It is enough to show that, for any distribution q ∈ ∆ M , any best response i 1 and any second-best response i 2 are neighbors in the graph G. By the way of contradiction, we assume that actions i 1 and i 2 are not neighbors (that is, C i1 and C i2 do not share a face). We will then arrive at the conclusion that i 2 must be dominated by other actions, which is a contradiction because of our assumption that no action is completely dominated (that is minorized) by others.
Let
Ls be the minimum loss against the mixed strategy s. Since g is a minimum of
, it is concave and piece-wise linear. The linear parts of g correspond to the elements of the partition C. By our assumption, f i1 (q) < f i2 (q) and there is no hyperplane f i3 achieving at q a value in the interval (f i1 (q), f i2 (q)). Let
the intersection of two hyperplanes over the simplex. Note that projection of S onto the simplex would be precisely the boundary separating C i1 and C i2 if these were the only two actions. This set cannot be empty, for otherwise action i 2 is dominated by i 1 . Now, pick any p ∈ ∆ M such that f i1 (p) = f i2 (p), and let a = (p, f i1 (p)) (see Figure 3 ). We will now work with the one-dimensional problem along the line in the simplex defined by (q, p). The fact that i 1 and i 2 are not neighbors along the direction (q, p) means that there is another action
, there must be a point b = (r, f i3 (r)) = (r, f i2 (r)) of intersection of f i3 and f i2 for some r ∈ [q, p]. It is easy to see that i 2 is i j G Figure 2 : To each vertex i in the graph G we associate an algorithm A i . The algorithm plays an action from the distribution q t i over its neighborhood set N i and receives partial information about relative loss between the node i and its neighbor. The other piece of the partial information comes from the times when a neighboring algorithm A j is run and the action i is picked. 
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9: end for completely minorized along the direction (q, p): on one side of r it is dominated by i 1 , while on the otherby i 3 . The argument above works for any direction from q towards the boundary between C i1 and C i2 if i 1 and i 2 were the only actions. Hence, i 2 is globally dominated by other actions, a contradiction.
Method
The method is a two-level procedure motivated by Foster and Vohra [7] and Blum and Mansour [5] . The intuition stems from the following observation. Suppose for each vertex i we have a distribution q i ∈ ∆ N supported on the neighbor set N i . Let p ∈ ∆ N be defined by p = Qp where Q is the matrix [q 1 , . . . , q N ]. Then there are two equivalent ways of sampling an action from p. First way is to directly sample the vertex according to p. Second is to sample a vertex i according to p and then choose a vertex j within the neighbor set N i according to q i . Because of the stationarity (or flow ) condition p = Qp, the two ways are equivalent. This idea of finding a fixed point is implicit in [7] , and Blum and Mansour [5] show how stationarity can be used to convert external regret guarantees into an internal regret statement. We show here that, in fact, this conversion can be done "locally" and only with "comparison" information between neighboring actions.
Our procedure is as follows. We run N different algorithms A 1 , . . . , A N , each corresponding to a vertex and its neighbor set. Within this neighbor set we obtain small regret because we can construct estimates of loss differences among the actions, thanks to the local observability condition. Each algorithm A i produces a distribution q 
Increase the count s ← s + 1 computes p t as a fixed point
How do we choose our actions? At each round, we draw k t ∼ p t and then I t ∼ q t kt according to our two-level scheme. The action I t is the action we play in the partial monitoring game against the adversary. Let the action played by the adversary at time t be denoted by j t . Then the feedback we obtain is S It e jt . This information is passed to A kt which updates the distributions q t kt . In Section 4.2 we detail how this is done.
Main Result
The main result of the paper is the following internal regret guarantee. We remark that high probability bounds can also be obtained in a rather straightforward manner, using, for instance, the approach of [1] . Another extension, the case of random signals, is discussed in Section 5.
Estimating loss differences
The random variable k t drawn from p t at time t determines which algorithm is active on the given round. Let
I {k t = i}} denote the (random) time when the algorithm A i is invoked for the s-th time. By convention, τ i (0) = 0. Further, define π i (t) = min{t ≥ t : k t = i} to denote the next time the algorithm is run on or after time t. When invoked for the s-th time, the algorithm A i constructs estimates
for all the rounds after it has been run the last time, until (and including) the current time r = τ i (s). We can assume b t (i,j) = 0 for any j / ∈ N i . The estimates b t (i,j) can be constructed by the algorithm because S Ir e jr is precisely the feedback given to the algorithm.
Let F t be the σ-algebra generated by the random variables {k 1 , I 1 , . . . , k t , I t }. For any t, the (conditional) expectation,
where in the second equality we used the fact that
by stationarity (1). Thus each algorithm A i , on average, has access to unbiased estimates of the loss differences within its neighborhood set.
Recall that algorithm A i is only aware of its neighborhood, and therefore we peg coordinates of q t i to zero outside of N i . However, for convenience, our notation below still employs full N -dimensional vectors, and we keep in mind that only coordinates indexed by N i are considered and modified by A i .
When invoked for the s-th time (that is, t = τ i (s)), A i constructs linear functions (cost estimates) f
We now show thatf
has the same conditional expectation as the actual loss of the meta algorithm Neighborhood Watch at time t = τ i (s). That is, by bounding expected regret of the black-box algorithm operating on {f s i }, we bound the actual regret suffered by the meta algorithm on the rounds when A i was invoked.
Lemma 4.1. Consider algorithm A i . It holds that
Proof. Throughout the proof, we drop the subscript i on τ i to ease the notation. Note that q
since the distribution is not updated when algorithm A i is not invoked. Hence, conditioned on F τ (s) , the variable (q τ (s+1) i − e u ) can be taken out of the expectation. We therefore need to show that
First, we can write
The last step follows because the event {t ≤ τ (s + 1)} is F t−1 -measurable (that is, variables k 1 , . . . , k t−1 determine the value of the indicator). By Eq. (2), we conclude
Since I {t = τ (s + 1)} = I {k t = i} I {t ≤ τ (s + 1)}, we have
Combining with Eq. (4),
Observe that coordinates off
, and e u are zero outside of N i . We then have that
is a scalar. When multiplying the above expression by q τ (s+1) i −e u , the term c·1 Ni vanishes. Thus, minimizing regret with relative costs (with respect to the ith action) is the same as minimizing regret with the absolute costs. We conclude that
Regret Analysis
For each algorithm A i , the estimatesf s i are passed to a full-information black box algorithm which works only on the coordinates N i . From the point of view of the full-information black box, the game has length T i = max{s : τ i (s) ≤ T }, the (random) number of times action i has been played within T rounds.
We proceed similarly to [1] : we use a full-information online convex optimization procedure with an entropy regularizer (also known as the Exponential Weights Algorithm) which receives the vectorf s i and returns the next mixed strategy x s+1 ∈ ∆ N (in fact, effectively in ∆ |Ni| ). We then define
where γ is to be specified later. Since A i is run at time t, we have τ i (s) = t by definition. The next time A i is active (that is, at time τ i (s + 1)), the action I τi(s+1) will be played as a random draw from q
; that is, the distribution is not modified on the interval {τ i (s) + 1, . . . , τ i (s + 1)}.
We prove Theorem 4.1 by a series of lemmas. The first one is a direct consequence of an external regret bound for a Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) algorithm in terms of local norms [1] . For a strictly convex "regularizer" F , the local norm · x is defined by z x = z T ∇ 2 F (x)z and its dual is z *
Lemma 4.2. The full-information algorithm utilized by A i has an upper bound
on its external regret, where φ(i) ∈ N i is any neighbor of i,¯ = max i,j L i,j , and η is a learning rate parameter to be tuned later.
Proof. Since our decision space is a simplex, it is natural to use the (negative) entropy regularizer, in which case FTRL is the same as the Exponential Weights Algorithm. From [1, Thm 2.1], for any comparator u with zero support outside |N i |, the following regret guarantee holds:
An easy calculation shows that in the case of entropy regularizer F , the Hessian
. We refer to [1] for more details. Let φ : {1, . . . , N } → {1, . . . , N } be a local departure function (see Definition 3.1). We can then write a regret guarantee
Since, in fact, we play according to a slightly modified version q
Taking expectations of both sides and upper bounding |N i | by N ,
A proof identical to that of Lemma 4.1 gives
for the last term, where¯ is the upper bound on the magnitude of entries of L. Putting everything together,
where we have upper bounded T i by T .
As with many bandit-type problems, effort is required to show that the variance term is controlled. This is the subject of the next lemma. x s , we therefore have two difficulties: controlling the number of constant-size terms and making sure the last term does not explode due to division by a small probability q r i (j). The former is solved below by a careful argument below, while the latter problem is solved according to usual bandit-style arguments.
More precisely, we can writef , h τi(s) ∈ R N are defined as
We will bound each of the two terms separately, in expectation. For the second term,
The remaining division by the probability disappears under the expectation:
Consider now the second term. As discussed in the proof of Lemma 4.2, the inverse Hessian of the entropy function shrinks each coordinate i precisely by x s (i) ≤ 1, implying that the local norm is dominated by the Euclidean norm : g
It is therefore enough to upper bound E
2 . The idea of the proof is the following. Observe that P(k t = i|F t−1 ) = P(I t = i|F t−1 ). Conditioned on the event that either k t = i or I t = i, each of the two possibilities has probability 1/2 of occurring. Note that g τi(s−1) inflates every time k t = i, yet I t = i occurs. It is then easy to see that magnitude of g τi(s−1) is unlikely to get large before algorithm A i is run again. We now make this intuition precise.
The function g t is presently defined only for those time steps when t = τ i (s) for some s (that is, when the algorithm A i is invoked). We extend this definition as follows. Let the jth coordinate of g t be defined as g t π(t+1) (j) g t (j) π(t+1)−1 r=t I {I r = i} v (i,j) S i e jr for j ∈ N i and 0 otherwise. The function g t can be thought of as accumulating partial pieces on rounds when I t = i until k t = i occurs. Let us now define an analogue of τ and π for the event that either I t = i or k t = i: γ i (s) = min t : s = t r=1 I {k t = i or I t = i} Further, for any t, let ν i (t) = min{t ≥ t : k t = i or I t = i}, the next time occurrence of the event {k τ = i or I τ = i} on or after t. Let I = I {ν i (t) = π i (t)} be the indicator of the event that the first time after t that {k τ = i or I τ = i} occurred it was also the case that the algorithm was not run (i.e. k τ = i). Note that g t (j) can now be written recursively as g t (j) = I · v (i,j) S i e j ν(t) + g ν(t)+1 π(ν(t)+1) (j) .
As argued before, P(I = 1|F t−1 ) = 1/2. We will now show that E {g t (j) | F t−1 } ≤ 2v by the following inductive argument, whose base case trivially holds for t = T : E g t (j) F t−1 = E E I · v (i,j) S i e j ν(t) + g ν(t)+1 (j) F ν(t) F t−1 = E Iv (i,j) S i e j ν(t) + IE g ν(t)+1 (j) F ν(t) F t−1
≤v + E Ig ν(t)+1 (j) F t−1
=v + E I E g ν(t)+1 (j) F ν(t)
≤ 2v by induction
≤v + E {I | F t−1 } 2v ≤v + (1/2)2v = 2v
The expected value of (g t (j)) 2 can be controlled in a similar manner. To ease the notation, let z = v (i,j) S i e j ν(t) . Using the upper bound for the conditional expectation of g t (j) calculated above,
The argument now proceeds with backward induction exactly as above. We conclude that Summing over t = 1, . . . , T and observing that only one algorithm is run at any time t proves the statement.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The flow condition p t = Q t p t comes in crucially in several places throughout the proofs, and the next argument is one of them. Observe that E e φ(It) F t−1 = 
